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CASENOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DUE PROCESS CLAUSE-THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT
REQUIRES FAIR NOTICE OF WHAT VIOLATES FEDERAL
AGENCYS INDECENCY STANDARDS. Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 132 S. CT. 2307 (2012).
JON MILLS
In Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations,
Inc.,' the United States Supreme Court addressed the fair notice
requirements of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause2 in
relation to the Federal Communications Commission's (the Com-
mission) broadcasting standards. The broadcasting standards at
issue were the result of a 2004 modification of the Commission's
indecency policy. This modification banned fleeting expletives
and momentary nudity on television, both of which were not pre-
viously found to be actionably indecent by the Commission.5 Fox
Television Stations, Inc. (Fox) and ABC Television Network (ABC)
challenged the modification to the indecency policy after the
Commission found Fox and ABC to be in violation of the Commis-
sion's indecency standards.
After receiving complaints about the content of the three
broadcasts at issue, the Commission ruled that the broadcasts were
actionably indecent. The first two broadcasts aired by Fox con-
tained fleeting expletives." The first broadcast at issue was the 2002
Billboard Music Awards,9 where the singer Cher was accepting an
award and said, "I've also had my critics for the last 40 years saying
(Fox II), 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012).
2 "[N]or [shall any person] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2317.
' Id. at 2314-17.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 2315-17.
7 Id. at 2314-17
Id. at 2314.
'2002 Billboard Music Awards (Fox television broadcast Dec. 9, 2002).
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that I was on my way out every year. Right. So f * * * 'em."'o The
second Fox broadcast at issue was the 2003 Billboard Music
Awards," where the reality television star Nicole Richie remarked,
"Have you ever tried to get cow s* * * out of a Prada purse? It's not
so f* * *ing simple." 2 The third broadcast considered indecent
concerned an episode of "NYPD Blue," 3 which aired on ABC. 4
During the episode, a woman's nude buttocks was shown for seven
seconds and the side of her breast was shown for a brief moment.'5
The Fox broadcasts at issue aired in 2002 and 2003,6 and the
ABC broadcast occurred in 2003." After they aired, the Commis-
sion received indecency complaints about all three broadcasts, 8
however, at the time there was nothing in the Commission's regula-
tory framework to conclude the broadcasts were in violation of its
indecency standards.'9 In 2004, after the broadcasts aired, the
Commission issued an order (Golden Globes Order),2o which changed
the way the Commission enforced its policy against indecent televi-
sion broadcasting.
The Golden Globes Order was issued in response to the 2003
Golden Globe Awards broadcast, where singer Bono stated: "This is
really, really, f * * * * ing brilliant. Really, really great."22 Despite
the brevity and fleeting use of the word in the broadcast, the
Commission held the use of the F-word to be actionably indecent.23
Before this modification, the Commission distinguished between
"o Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2314 (citing Fox Television Stations Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n, 613 F.3d 317, 323 (2nd Cir. 2010)).
" 2003 Billboard Music Awards (Fox television broadcast Dec. 10, 2003).
2 Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2314 (citing Fox Television Stations Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n, 613 F.3d at 323).
's NYPD Blue (ABC television broadcast Feb. 25, 2003).
" Fox l, 132 S. Ct. at 2314.
Id.
' Id.
17 Id.
1 Id.
' See generally id. at 2312-17 (discussing the Commission's regulatory framework).
2o In re Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of
the "Golden Globes Awards" Program (Golden Globes Order), 19 FCC Rcd. 4975
(2004).
" See id. at 4975-76, 4978-80; Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2314-15 ("Turning to the isolated
nature of the expletive, the Commission reversed prior rulings that had found
fleeting expletives not indecent.").
2 Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2314 (quoting Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4976).
2 Id. (citing Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4975-76). The Commission ex-
plained that the F-word was actionably indecent because it was "one of the most
vulgar, graphic and explicit descriptions of sexual activity in the English language,
[and] any use of that word or a variation in any context, inherently has a sexual
connotation." Id. (quoting Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Red. at 4975-76, 4978-79).
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the "repetitive occurrence of the 'indecent words' . . . and an 'iso-
lated' or 'occasional' expletive, that would not necessarily be ac-
tionable." However with the Golden Globes Order, the Commission
disregarded its previous stance by finding that isolated or fleeting
use of expletives in a television broadcast could be considered ac-
tionably indecent.25
Armed with the Golden Globes Order which was not in existence
at the time the broadcasts at issue occurred, the Commission issued
rulings on the Fox and ABC broadcasts in 200626 and 2008 respec-
tively.2 8  Applying the Golden Globes Order to the broadcasts, the
Commission determined that Fox and ABC were in violation of its
new indecency standards as the Fox broadcasts contained fleeting
use of the F-word and the ABC broadcast portrayed fleeting nudi-
t-29ty."
After the Commission's 2006 ruling on the Fox broadcasts, var-
30ious parties petitioned for a review of the Commission's order.
The Commission requested a voluntary remand, which the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted, "so that
[the Commission] could respond to the parties' objections."30 In its
remand order, the Commission found that both Fox broadcasts fell
within the regulatory scope of patently offensive material, allowing
a finding of indecency.2 The Commission, however, decided it
24 Id. at 2313 (quoting In re Application of WGBH Educ. Found., 69 FCC 2d. 1250,
1254 (1978)).
2 Id. at 2313-15 (quoting Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Rcd. at 4980) ("[T]he mere
fact that specific words or phrases are not sustained or repeated does not mandate
a finding that material that is otherwise patently offensive to the broadcast me-
dium is not indecent.").
2 In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2,
2002, and March 8, 2005, 21 FCC Rcd. 2664, 2665, 2692 (2006).
27 In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Concerning Their Febru-
ary 24, 2003 Broadcast of the Program "NYPD Blue," (NYPD Blue Order) 23 FCC
Rcd. 3147, 3168 (2008).
8 See Fox II, 132 S. CL at 2315.
2 Id. at 2314-17. Although the Golden Globes Order focused on an incident involv-
ing indecent language, the Commission expanded it to "fleeting expletives and
fleeting nudity," covering both the Fox and ABC broadcasts. Id. at 2315.
* Id.
" Id.
' Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Commission explained that the finding was
based off of its definition of patently offensive contained in its 2001 policy state-
ment. However, the Commission relied on its Golden Globes Order to further ex-
plain that "requiring repeated use of expletives in order to find material indecent
[was] inconsistent with [its] general approach to indecency enforcement." Fox II,
132 S. Ct. at 2315 (quoting In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broad-
casts Between February 2, 2002, and March 8, 2005 (Remand Order), 21 FCC Rcd.
13299, 13308 (2006)).
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would not impose a penalty for the broadcast since "it was not ap-
parent that Fox could be penalized for Cher's comment at the time
it was broadcast."3 3
Fox appealed, and the Second Circuit found the remand order
arbitrary and capricious, stating that, "the FCC has made a 180-
degree turn regarding its treatment of 'fleeting expletives' without
providing a reasoned explanation justifying the about-face." 4 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and found the Commission's
new indecency policy and its enforcement "neither arbitrary nor
capricious."3 5  The Court then remanded the case to allow "the
[c]ourt of [a]ppeals to address respondents' First Amendment
challenges."3 6 On remand, the Second Circuit invalidated the poli-
1 Id. (quoting Remand Order, 21 FCC Rcd. at 13324).
Id. (quoting Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 489 F.3d
444,455 (2nd Cir. 2007)).
3 Id. at 2315-16 (citing Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.
(Fox 1), 556 U.S. 502, 517, 530 (2009). After the Second Circuit prohibited the
enforcement policy under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), the Commis-
sion appealed. Fox , 556 U.S. at 516. Under the Administrative Procedure Act,
the court has the ability to set aside agency action that is arbitrary or capricious:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional
and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of
the terms of an agency action. The reviewing court shall:
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
found to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law.
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); see Fox I, 132 S. Ct. at 2315. The Supreme Court
found that under this Act, an agency was not required to prove its changes are
better than previous policy or detail its justifications. Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2316
(citing Fox 1, 556 U.S. at 515). Moreover, the Court agreed with the Commission
in its new approach to examine "the patent offensiveness of even isolated uses of
sexual and excretory words [as such] fits with the context-based approach [ap-
proved] . . . in Pacifica." Id. at 2316 (citing Fox I, 556 U.S. at 517).
36Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2316. In Fox II, the Court discussed the Second Circuit's
decision further:
The Court of Appeals found the vagueness inherent in the policy had
forced broadcasters to 'choose between not airing . .. controversial pro-
grams [or] risking massive fines or possibly even loss of their licenses.'
And the court found there was 'ample evidence in the record' that this
harsh choice had led to a chill of protected speech.
Id. (quoting Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 613 F.3d
317, 334 (2nd Cir. 2010)) (citations omitted).
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cy on constitutional grounds due to the policy's vagueness and the
Commission's lack of consistency in its ruling. The.court of ap-
peals stated that the Commission's standards "failed to give broad-
casters sufficient notice of what would be considered indecent.",
Subsequently, the Commission appealed and sought certiorari
from the United States Supreme Court."
Turning to the ABC case, in 2008 a forfeiture order was issued
against ABC after the Commission determined the nudity in "NYPD
Blue" broadcast to be actionably indecent.40 A $27,500 forfeiture
was imposed "on each of the [fourty-five] ABC-affiliated stations
that aired the indecent episode."4 ' The Second Circuit, however,
struck down the Commission's forfeiture order based on the
court's prior holding in the case, which invalidated the indecency
policy in its entirety.42  The Commission appealed, and the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari to review the Fox and ABC judg-
ments collectively.43
At the time of the broadcasts at issue, the Commission's regu-
latory framework was mainly derived from Federal Communications
Commission v. Pacifica Foundation44 and a 2001 Commission Policy
Statement (2001 Policy Statement).45 The Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Pacifica-that George Carlin's "Filthy Words" monologue was
indecent-was rather narrow because the Court did not venture
into whether "an occasional expletive . . . would justify any sanc-
tion." Following its interpretation of Pacifica, the Commission
3 Id. (citing Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, 613 F.3d at
327).
8 Id.
3 Id. at 2317.
4 Id. Specifically, the Commission noted that nudity displayed during the broad-
cast was "patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards,"
as it was "associated with sexual arousal and . . . excretory activities" and was "pre-
sented in a manner that clearly panders to and titillates the audience." Fox II, 132
S. Ct. at 2316-17 (quoting NYPD Blue Order, 23 FCC Rcd. 3147, 3150, 3153 (2008)).
Id. at 2317.
42 Id.
43Id.
4 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Pacifica, the Court upheld the Commission's decision
"that George Carlin's 'Filthy Words' monologue was indecent." Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at
2312. The monologue contained "language that describes, in terms patently of-
fensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs at times of the day when there is
a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience." Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 732.
4 In re Industry Guidance on Commission's Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. §
1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency (2001 Policy State-
ment), 16 FCC Rcd. 7999 (2001).
Pacfica, 438 U.S. at 750. George Carlin's monologue was an expletive-filled
comedy bit that was "vulgar, offensive, and shocking," leaving no doubt that it
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issued the 2001 Policy Statement in an attempt to give insight into
its interpretation of and enforcement against indecent television
broadcasts. In the 2001 Policy Statement, the Commission indi-
cated that a significant factor in determining what is patently offen-
sive was "whether the material dwells on or repeats at length" the
offending description or depiction." Despite the Commission's
regulatory framework at the time of the Fox and ABC broadcasts,
the Commission applied its 2004 Golden Globes Order to find the
broadcasts actionably indecent. 9 Subsequently, the Supreme Court
was faced with the question of whether Fox and ABC had fair no-
tice of what the Commission considered actionably indecent at the
time the broadcasts aired."
Justice Kennedy, delivering the opinion of the Court, held that
the broadcasts were not actionable under the Commission's inde-
cency standards in place at the time the broadcasts were aired and
subsequently vacated the judgments of the Second Circuit and re-
manded the cases for further proceedings." In reaching this con-
clusion, Justice Kennedy explained that, "[a] fundamental prin-
ciple in our legal system is that laws which regulate persons or enti-
ties must give fair notice of conduct that is forbidden or re-
contained more than just an occasional expletive. Id. at 747 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Later however, the Commission extended its application of Paci-
fica and held it would look past the seven specific words in Carlin's monologue
and would examine "the full context of allegedly indecent broadcasts rather than
limiting its regulation to a 'comprehensive index ... of indecent words or pictorial
descriptions.'" Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2313 (quoting In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp.,
3 FCC Rcd. 930, 932 (1987)) (ellipsis in original). The Court in Fox noted howev-
er, the Commission continued to distinguish between repeated and deliberate
indecent content and that of isolated indecent material. Id.
7 Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2313. Specifically, the 2001 Policy Statement "intended 'to
provide guidance to the broadcast industry regarding [its] caselaw interpreting 18
U.S.C. § 1464 and [its] enforcement policies with respect to broadcast indecen-
cy.'" Id. (alteration to original in quoted text) (quoting 2001 Policy Statement, 16
FCC Rcd. 7999). Title 18 U.S.C. § 1464 bans the broadcast of "any obscene, inde-
cent, or profane language." Id. at 2312.
4 Id. Moreover, the statement provided that depictions of "sexual or excretory
organs or activities" could be considered patently offensive and indecent based on
the explicitness of the depiction, the length or repetition of the depiction, and the
use of pandering or shock value. Id. (citing 2001 Policy Statement, 16 FCC Rcd. at
8002-03). In line with the Commission's once held views on fleeting and isolated
material, the 2001 Policy Statement also made clear that certain material that was
"fleeting and isolated" was not actionably indecent. Id. at 2314 (citing 2001 Policy
Statement, 16 FCC Rcd. at 8008-09).
Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2314-15.
5 Id. at 2317-19.
-" Id. at 2320.
[Vol. 43:3578
20131 FAIR NOTICE OF FCC'S INDECENCY STANDARDS REQUIRED 579
quired."52  This principle is guaranteed under the Due Process
Clause, and as a result, when laws are "impermissibly vague" they
will be invalidated." A law will be impermissibly vague when a rea-
sonably intelligent person is without fair notice of what actions the
law prohibits or what facts must be proven under the regulation."
Following that principle, the Court found that the Commission's
standards were too vague as applied to these specific broadcasts
because at the time of the broadcasts, the networks were not put on
notice of what content was forbidden."
The regulatory framework existing at the time of the broad-
casts did not put the networks on notice that fleeting expletives or a
brief moment of nudity could be actionably indecent. 6 At the time
of the broadcasts in 2002 and 2003, Fox and ABC were functioning
within the regulatory framework derived from Pacifica, the 2001
Policy Statement, and other Commission rulings issued prior to the
broadcasts.7 These regulations made it clear that the Commis-
sion's focus in an indecency determination at the time of the
broadcast was whether the indecent material was "dwell[ed] on or
repeat[ed] at length,"" and an indecency violation based on fleet-
ing expletives or nudity was not a known consequence." The
Commission subsequently amended this framework through its
Golden Globes Order in 2004.60 However, the Networks simply could
not be expected to broadcast material within the new indecency
standards when those standards were not in existence at the time of
the broadcasts.6" This lead the Court to conclude that the Commis-
sion, by applying its Golden Globes Order retroactively to prior broad-
casts, violated the Networks' Fifth Amendment rights under the
Due Process Clause. Therefore, because the policies were too
vague and infringed on due process, the broadcasts could not be
actionable as indecent." In reaching this decision, the Supreme
52 Id. at 2317 (citing Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
5 Id.
5 Id.
5 Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2317-20.
5 Id. at 2318.
" See id. at 2313.
8 Id. at 2317-18.
' See id. at 2313-14; 2318.
6 Id.; see also Golden Globes Order, 19 FCC Rcd. 4975, 4975-76; 4978-80 (2004).
1 Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2320.
62 Id.
6 Id. at 2317.
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Court relied on its own consistent application of this principle in
.64interpreting due process issues.
In finding the enforcement framework void for vagueness, the
Court looked to its prior ruling in Connally v. General Construction
Co., 6which held that "a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application
violates the first essential of due process of law."6
In Connally, the United States Supreme Court addressed the is-
sue of fair notice in the context of an Oklahoma labor statute.67
The Commissioner of Labor of Oklahoma (the Commissioner) had
found General Construction Company (General) in violation of a
labor statute that prohibited employers from paying laborers wages
below the current rate of wages in the locality.6 General was under
contract with the state of Oklahoma to construct certain bridges
within the state.69  General paid certain laborers $3.20 per day,
"whereas, [the Commissioner] asserted, the current rate in the lo-
cality where the work was being done was $3.60" per day.o In his
complaint, the Commissioner relied on an investigation that found
the daily wages paid to laborers in the vicinity generally between
$3.00 and $4.00." The Commissioner set forth a bill declaring
6 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 306 (2008) (holding that child
pornography statute was not impermissibly vague); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451, 453 (1939) (holding that "[n]o one may be required at peril of life, li-
berty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes"); Connally v.
Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 393 (1926) (holding that an Oklahoma statute's
phrase "current rate of wages" was too vague to penalize a general contractor).
6 Connally, 269 U.S. at 391.
6 Id. (citing Int'l Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216, 221 (1914); Collins v.
Kentucky, 234 U.S. 634, 638 (1914)).
61 Id. at 388, 390.
w Id. at 388-90. The Court interpreted the former Oklahoma Code Section 7255,
which provided:
That not less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality
where the work is performed shall be paid to laborers, workmen, me-
chanics, prison guards, janitors in public institutions, or other persons so
employed by or on behalf of the state, . . . and laborers, workmen, me-
chanics, or other persons employed by contractors or subcontractors in
the execution of any contract or contracts with the state, . . . shall be
deemed to be employed by or on behalf of the state.
Id. at 388 (alteration to original in quoted text) (quoting former OKLA. COMP.
STAT., § 7255 (1921)).
"9 Id. at 389.
70 Connally, 269 U.S. at 389.
71 Id.
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General to be in violation of the labor statute. General applied
for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the enforcement of the
statute, which was granted by a three-judge court.13 The Commis-
sioner appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address the lack of certainty in the Oklahoma
statute." General claimed that the statute, if enforced, would "de-
prive [General], its officers, agents and representatives, of their
liberty and property without due process of law." 5
The Court noted that "generally. . . the decisions ... uphold-
ing statutes as sufficiently certain, rested upon the conclusion that
they employed words or phrases having a technical or other special
meaning, well enough known to enable those within their reach to
correctly apply them." The Court held that "the words 'current
rate of wages' [did] not denote a specific or definite sum," and that
the statute [was] even more uncertain due to the use of the word
"locality."77 The Court stated that " [w]ages have varied since [Gen-
eral] entered into its contracts ... and it is impossible to determine
... whether the sums paid by [General] or the amount designated
by the commissioner or either of them constitute the current per
diem wage in the locality." 8
The Court explained that a criminal statute must be certain
and cannot "rest upon an uncertain foundation." 9  Moreover,
"[t]he crime, and the elements constituting it, must be so clearly
expressed that the ordinary person can intelligently choose, in ad-
vance, what course it is lawful for him to pursue." 8 The Court rea-
soned that the statute at issue, with two uncertain terms present,
was not a valid criminal statute."
Connally stands for the proposition that due process requires
fair notice.2 Connally held that a contractor cannot be held crimi-
nally liable for its actions if the statute the contractor allegedly vi-
olated is so uncertain that it fails to provide fair notice as to what
conduct is prohibited. The same principle is seen in Fox where
72 Id.
7 Id. at 391.
74 Id.
7 Id. at 390.
76 Connally, 290 U.S. at 391 (citing Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S.
497, 502 (1925); Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U. S. 343, 348 (1918)).
7 Id. at 393-94.
78 Id. at 390.
79 Id. at 393.
80 Id.
8 Id. at 393.
See Connally, 290 U.S. at 391.
83 Id.
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the Court addressed the requirement of fair notice in the context
of a federal agency's retroactive enforcement of its indecency stan-
dards."' Based on the lack of notice, the Court found the Commis-
sion could not apply its 2004 policy modifications to broadcasts that
transpired in 2002 and 2003.
Similar to the issue in Fox, the Court addressed the retroactive
application of standards arising from a subsequent judicial decision
in Marks v. United States." In Marks, the "[p]etitioners were charged
with . . . transporting obscene materials. . . in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1465.""' The petitioners' actions, which led to the charges, took
place over a span of time ending February 27, 1973." The peti-
tioners were convicted in the district court,"9 which applied the
standards set forth in Miller v. California90 to instruct the jury.6 ' Mil-
ler was decided on June 21, 1973, which was between the time the
petitioners were arrested and the time their case went to trial.
Petitioners argued that they were entitled to jury instructions under
the standard developed in Memoirs v. Massachusetts,3 but the district
court overruled their objections. The petitioners then appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, where a
divided court affirmed the district court's convictions.95
14Fox II, 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2311, 2314-15, 2317-20 (2012).
* Id. at 2315-20.
8 430 U.S. 188 (1977).
Marks, 430 U.S. at 189. Section 1465 states, in pertinent part:
Whoever knowingly produces with the intent to transport, distribute, or
transmit in interstate or foreign commerce, or whoever knowingly trans-
ports or travels in, or uses a facility or means of, interstate or foreign
commerce or an interactive computer service (as defined in section
230(e)(2) of the Communications Act of 1934) in or affecting such
commerce, for the purpose of sale or distribution of any obscene, lewd,
lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing,
print, silhouette, drawing, figure, image, cast, phonograph recording,
electrical transcription or other article capable of producing sound or
any other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1465 (2012).
Marks, 430 U.S. at 189. "Petitioners were charged with several counts of trans-
porting obscene films in interstate commerce." See id. at 190.
'9 Id. at 191.
90 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
9 Marks, 430 U.S. at 191.
9 Id. at 190.
93 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion).
81 Marks, 430 U.S. at 190-91.
83 Id. at 191.
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Memoirs provided a more defendant-friendly interpretation of
the federal obscenity laws than the interpretation set forth in Mil-
ler." Under the Memoirs interpretation, "expressive material is con-
stitutionally protected unless it is 'utterly without redeeming social
value."'9 Under Miller, the test required the court to look at
"whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value,"98 which is a more onerous test than
that set forth in Memoirs." The reason for the petitioners' objection
to the application of the Miller standard, however, was that Miller
was not decided until after petitioners were indicted under 18
U.S.C. § 1465.00 Subsequently, the Supreme Court addressed the
lower courts' application of the Miller standard to conduct that took
place before Miller was decided.'o'
The Court concluded that the petitioners should only be held
criminally liable for conduct that was punishable under the pre-
vious Memoirs standard.0 2 The Court stated that "since the peti-
tioners were indicted for conduct occurring prior to our decision
in Miller, they are entitled to jury instructions requiring the jury to
acquit unless it finds that the materials involved are 'utterly without
redeeming social value.""03 Accordingly, the decision of the district
court, previously affirmed by the court of appeals, was reversed. 04
The Court stated that " [t] o apply Miller retroactively, and thereby
punish conduct innocent under Memoirs, violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment much as retroactive application of
a new statute to penalize conduct innocent when performed would
violate the Constitution's ban on ex post facto laws.',
05
The Court also looked to the principle of the Ex Post Facto
Clause,o'0 which is based on "the notion that persons have a right to
fair warning of" the conduct that gives "rise to criminal penal-
* Id. at 190.
97 Id. at 191 (quoting Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418) (plurality opinion)).
'8 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
9 Compare Miller 413 U.S. at 24, with Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418. Memoirs was not
only more favorable to the petitioners' defense but also-according to the peti-
tioners-should have been the controlling case on which their charges were adju-
dicated. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 190-91.
'*Marks, 430 U.S. at 189-91.
"o Id. at 188-90.
"aId. at 196.
' Id. (quoting Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 418).
4 Id. at 191, 197.
'
05 Id. at 191 (citing U.S. CONsr. art. 1, § 9, ci. 3).
"No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CONsT. art. 1, §
9, cl. 3.
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ties. "' The petitioners in Marks did not have fair notice of the
conduct that gave rise to the charges brought against them.'08 The
retroactive application of Miller did not stand up to the Supreme
Court's reasoned application of the Due Process and Ex Post Facto
Clauses of the Constitution." In Fox, the Supreme Court relied on
reasoning similar to that in Marks, to find that the Commission
could not retroactively apply the Golden Globes Order to the Net-
works' broadcasts."o
In 2008, the Court again addressed the issue of fair notice in
United States v. Williams."' In Williams, the defendant was charged
with violating 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (3) (B)," 2 which criminalizes
"the pandering or solicitation of child pornography.""'3 The de-
fendant posted a message in a chat room that contained a link to
seven pictures of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct."4
After obtaining a search warrant for the defendant's home, the
Secret Service found at least twenty-two pictures of "real children
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.""5  The defendant was
0o7 Marks, 430 U.S. 191 (citing United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954);
Lanzetta v. NewJersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939)).
... Id. at 196.
'"0Id.
"o See Fox I, 132 S. Ct. 2307, 2318 (2012).
.. 553 U.S. 285 (2008).
12 The statute holds:
(a) Any person who-
(3) knowingly-
(B) advertises, promotes, presents, distributes, or solicits through the
mails, or in interstate or foreign commerce by any means, including by
computer, any material or purported material in a manner that reflects
the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that the ma-
terial or purported material is, or contains-
(i) an obscene visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct; or
(ii) a visual depiction of an actual minor engaging in sexually explicit
conduct . .. shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B) (2012); Williams, 533 U.S. at 289-90 (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (3) (B)).
" Williams, 553 U.S. at 288 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a) (3) (B)).
" Id. at 291.
"1 Id. at 291-92.
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charged with two counts of violating the child pornography sta-
tute.16
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida convicted the defendant on both counts, imposing concur-
rent sixty-month prison terms and a $100 statutory assessment for
each count."' On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit reversed one of the convictions, "holding that
the [pandering] statute was both overbroad and impermissibly va-
gue.""s The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the
court of appeals, concluding that the statute did not violate the
First or Fifth Amendments."9 Justice Scalia delivering the opinion
of the Court, reasoned that the pandering statute is neither over-
broad nor impermissibly vague.o Congress's careful crafting of the
pandering statute survived the constitutional challenges brought
forward by the defendant.121
In addition to resolving whether the statute was overbroad un-
der the First Amendment, 22 the Court addressed whether the sta-
tute was impermissibly vague, thereby violating the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.'2  In its analysis, the Court ad-
dressed the void for vagueness doctrine, which the Court described
as "an outgrowth" of the Due Process Clause.124 Citing Hill v. Colo-
rado,'12 the Court acknowledged that "[a] conviction fails to com-
port with due process if the statute under which it is obtained fails
"
6 Id. at 292. "[Defendant] was charged with one count of pandering child porno-
graphy under §2252A(a) (3) (B) and one count of possessing child pornography
under §2252A(a) (5) (B)." Id.
"
7 Id.
1" Williams, 553 U.S. at 292 (quoting United States v. Williams, 444 F.3d 1286,
1308-09 (11th Cir. 2006)).
"' Id. at 292-307.
1o See id. at 287-88, 306-07.
121 Id. at 307.
22 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohi-
biting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Court stated,
"We have long held that obscene speech-sexually explicit material that violates
fundamental notions of decency-is not protected by the First Amendment."
Williams, 553 U.S. at 288 (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484-85
(1957)). The Court further stated, "Moreover, we have held that the government
may criminalize the possession of child pornography, even though it may not cri-
minalize the mere possession of obscene material involving adults. Id. (comparing
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110 (1990), with Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557,
568, 589 (1969)).
12 Williams, 553 U.S. at 288.
12 Id. at 304.
12530 U.S. 703, 732 (2000).
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to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is
prohibited."'2  However, the Court noted that crystal clear instruc-
tions are not required and that "[w]hat renders a statute vague is
not the possibility that it will sometimes be difficult to determine
whether the incriminating fact it establishes has been proved; but
rather the indeterminacy of precisely what that fact is." 2 1
With this background analysis, the Court then addressed the
exact wording of the statute to determine if, in fact, it was imper-
missibly vague. 2 8 Section 2252A(a) (3) (B) prohibits one from kno-
wingly distributing material "in a manner that reflects the belief, or
that is intended to cause another to believe" that the material is
child pornography.'"2 The court of appeals ruled that this phrase
was "so vague and standardless as to what may not be said that the
public is left with no objective measure to which behavior can be
conformed."'3 0 However, the Supreme Court disagreed, stating that
there is no indeterminacy in what the statute prohibits.'' The
Court stated that "[t]he statute requires that the defendant hold,
and make a statement that reflects, the belief that the material is
child pornography; or that he communicate in a manner intended
to cause another so to believe."' 2 This reasoning led the Court to
determine that the statute was not impermissibly vague.3
While the Court in Williams determined that the pandering
provision of Section 2252A did not violate the Due Process Clause,
the Court did not contradict the constitutional requirement of fair
notice.'- The Court's line of reasoning is similar to that set forth in
Connally and Marks, as well as Fox.'3 1 In Fox, the Court continued
this consistent line of thinking in the context of an agency regula-
tion-requiring regulatory language to be certain enough as to not
be too vague and prohibiting retroactive enforcement in violation
of the fair notice requirement of due process. 3 6
6 Williams, 553 U.S. at 304.
'Id. at 306.
"Id. at 304-07.
'2 Id. at 289-90.
' Id. at 304-05.
".'Id. at 306.
Williams, 553 U.S. at 306.
" Id.
Id. at 304, 306-07.
" The Due Process Clause requires fair notice. See generally Fox II, 132 S. CL 2307,
2320 (2012); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); Connally v. Gen. Constr.
Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926).
'3"Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2320.
Vol. 43:3586
2013] FAIR NOTICE OFFCC'S INDECENCY STANDARDS REQUIRED 587
In Connally, the Court's main due process issue was the vague-
ness of the applicable Oklahoma labor statute. 3  The Court rea-
soned that the disparity of meanings as to the phrase "current rate
of wages" prohibited the enforcement of the statute." The con-
tractor, General, could not identify an exact wage to pay its laborers
based on the statute. Therefore, the Court prevented the Commis-
sioner of Labor of Oklahoma from enforcing the penalties of the
statute. The Court's reasoning is consistent with the doctrine of
fair notice, which "goes to the very heart of the principle of the rule
of law-that individuals should be treated in accordance with arti-
culated legal standards."4 0
In Marks, the Court addressed the retroactive application of
jury instructions stemming from an interpretation of a criminal
statute that were set forth after the underlying conduct occurred in
Marks.'4 1 The Court ruled that this form of enforcement violated
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.4 2 An individual
cannot be expected to abide by standards that are not incorporated
into the law at the time of his or her actions. Applying this prin-
ciple to Fox, the Court added to the framework and established that
federal agencies cannot "promulgate retroactive rules" unless Con-
gress expressly grants statutory authority.143 Thus in Fox, as there
was no express grant by Congress, the Commission could not apply
the 2004 Golden Globes Order to broadcasts that took place in 2002
and 2003.
In Williams, although the Court reversed the decision to vacate
the defendant's conviction, the Court was consistent with its prior
rulings on fair notice. The Court found that the child pornogra-
phy statute was not so vague that it failed to provide fair notice to "a
person of ordinary intelligence."'4 5 Thus, the Court held that even
though it may be difficult to determine the clear meaning of a sta-
1 Connally, 269 U.S. at 390.
13 Id. at 393.
Id. at 396.
"o Albert C. Lin, Refining Fair Notice Doctrine: What Notice is Required of Civil Regula-
tions?, 55 BAYLOR L. REv. 991, 996 (2003) (citing Jason Nichols, Note, Sorry! What
the Regulation Really Means is . . .": Administrative Agencies' Ability to Alter an Existing
Regulatory Landscape Through Reinterpretation of Rules, 80 TEx. L. REv. 951, 964-68
(2002)).
". Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 189-90 (1977).
1
4
1 Id. at 191.
'1 Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (finding a rule that
retroactively changed Medicare cost limits for services already performed and
reimbursed unconstitutional).
' United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304-07 (2008).
1- Id. at 304, 306.
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tute, these conditions alone do not make the statute void for va-
gueness. Williams was the last time the Court seriously waded into
the due process waters before the Court granted certiorari to de-
cide Fox.
In Fox, the Supreme Court had another chance to interpret
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. With this op-
portunity, the Court incorporated various principles underlying the
Due Process Clause to determine that the Commission did not pro-
vide fair notice to Fox and ABC.4 8 The framework in place at the
time of the Networks' broadcasts did not include the indecency
standards set forth in the Golden Globes Order."'9 As a result, the net-
works were unaware, at the time of the broadcasts, that the content
would be actionably indecent at a future time.15 0 Therefore, the
Court held that the Commission could not retroactively enforce the
standards to broadcasts aired prior to the promulgation of those
standards.'*' In its opinion, the Court provided even more clarity to
the requirements of due process, providing governmental agencies
with guidance concerning the future enforcement of their regula-
tory standards.
While the Court came to a conclusion on the due process
question, it left several questions unanswered in the Fox opinion.'"
The Court declined to address the "First Amendment implications
of the Commission's indecency policy."'53 In addition, the Court
left "the Commission free to modify its current indecency policy in
light of its determination of the public interest and applicable legal
requirements."'54 Therefore, while the interpretation of the Due
Process Clause appears to continue down the path set forth in pre-
vious decisions of the Court, the First Amendment and indecency
policy questions are left to be determined another day.'15 The deci-
sion not to address these questions follows Court precedent of "de-
clining to decide cases not before it."5 6
The fair notice doctrine remains a vital protection offered to
citizens of this country through the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
" Id. at 306.
"'Fox II, 132 S. Ct. 2307 (2012).
"' Id. at 2320. Specifically, the Court incorporated the void for vagueness doctrine
and the prohibition against retroactive law making. Id.
'"
9 Id. at 2315.
'5 Id. at 2320.
' Id. at 2317-2320.
51 See Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2320.
'
53 Id.
' Id.
"Id. (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631 (1950)).
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Amendment of the Constitution. In Fox, the Court applied this
doctrine to the enforcement of a governmental agency's indecency
standards.15 ' The decision follows a line of cases that prohibit stan-
dards from being impermissibly vague or applied retroactively.
Our judicial system certainly will be confronted with cases in the
future that require further interpretation of the Due Process
Clause. Fox will be another guidepost for the system to follow, pro-
viding persons and entities more clarity as to what the doctrine of
fair notice requires.59
1 Id.
'"See supra note 64.
'5 See generally Fox II, 132 S. Ct. at 2307.

